Perkenalkan, Inilah Uji Petik Filsafat
Refleksi kuliah 13 Filsafat Ilmu
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NURAFNI RETNO KURNIASIH / 15709251007
Selasa, 15 Desember 2015 ruang 305b
gedung pasca lama.
Prof.Dr.Marsigit, M.A.
Bismillahirrahmanirrahim,
Assalamualaikum
wr.wb.
Pada pertemuan perkuliahan ketiga belas, seperti
biasa bapak Marsigit mengawali dengan berdoa bersama. Pada pertemuan terakhir
ini cukup spesial yaitu karena diadakan uji petik filsafat. Uji petik itu
artinya kita memanfaatkan pengetahuan kita masing – masing untuk meningkatkan
dimensi kita dengan cara membaca. Yang dibaca bukan hal yang sepele, yang dibaca
adalah sesuatu yang dapat dicoba untuk munguji diri kita sendiri apakah mampu
atau tidak.
The real philosophy ditunjukkan dengan membaca
referensi bacaan yang memang bersumber dari teori filsafat, bukan hanya tes
jawab singkat seperti pada pertemuan sebelumnya yang kemudian setelah membaca
dapat menghasilkan karya. Referensi yang diujikan pada uji petik diambil dari
karya Immanuel Kant yang berjudul “The Critique
of Pure Reason” tahun 1781 pada Preface To The First Edition. Berikut preface nya:
HUMAN REASON, in
one sphere of its cognition, is called upon to consider questions, which it
cannot decline, as they are presented by its own nature, but which it cannot
answer, as they transcend every faculty of the mind.
It falls into
this difficulty without any fault of its own. It begins with principles, which
cannot be dispensed with in the field of experience, and the truth and
sufficiency of which are, at the same time, insured by experience. With these
principles it rises, in obedience to the laws of its own nature, to ever higher
and more remote conditions. But it quickly discovers that, in this way, its
labours must remain ever incomplete, because new questions never cease to
present themselves; and thus it finds itself compelled to have recourse to
principles which transcend the region of experience, while they are regarded by
common sense without distrust. It thus falls into confusion and contradictions,
from which it conjectures the presence of latent errors, which, however, it is
unable to discover, because the principles it employs, transcending the limits
of experience, cannot be tested by that criterion. The arena of these endless
contests is called Metaphysic.
Time was, when
she was the queen of all the sciences; and, if we take the will for the deed,
she certainly deserves, so far as regards the high importance of her
object-matter, this title of honour. Now, it is the fashion of the time to heap
contempt and scorn upon her; and the matron mourns, forlorn and forsaken, like
Hecuba:
Modo maxima rerum,
Tot generis, natisque potens …
Nunc trahor exul, inops.
— Ovid, Metamorphoses. Xiii
At first, her
government, under the administration of the dogmatists, was an absolute
despotism. But, as the legislative continued to show traces of the ancient
barbaric rule, her empire gradually broke up, and intestine wars introduced the
reign of anarchy; while the sceptics, like nomadic tribes, who hate a permanent
habitation and settled mode of living, attacked from time to time those who had
organized themselves into civil communities. But their number was, very
happily, small; and thus they could not entirely put a stop to the exertions of
those who persisted in raising new edifices, although on no settled or uniform
plan. In recent times the hope dawned upon us of seeing those disputes settled,
and the legitimacy of her claims established by a kind of physiology of the
human understanding—that of the celebrated Locke. But it was found
that—although it was affirmed that this so-called queen could not refer her
descent to any higher source than that of common experience, a circumstance
which necessarily brought suspicion on her claims—as this genealogy was
incorrect, she persisted in the advancement of her claims to sovereignty. Thus
metaphysics necessarily fell back into the antiquated and rotten constitution
of dogmatism, and again became obnoxious to the contempt from which efforts had
been made to save it. At present, as all methods, according to the general
persuasion, have been tried in vain, there reigns nought but weariness and
complete indiffer entism—the mother of chaos and night in the scientific world,
but at the same time the source of, or at least the prelude to, the re-creation
and reinstallation of a science, when it has fallen into confusion, obscurity,
and disuse from ill directed effort.
For it is in
reality vain to profess indifference in regard to such inquiries, the object of
which cannot be indifferent to humanity. Besides, these pretended
indifferentists, however much they may try to disguise themselves by the
assumption of a popular style and by changes on the language of the schools,
unavoidably fall into metaphysical declarations and propositions, which they
profess to regard with so much contempt. At the same time, this indifference,
which has arisen in the world of science, and which relates to that kind of
knowledge which we should wish to see destroyed the last, is a phenomenon that
well deserves our attention and reflection. It is plainly not the effect of the
levity, but of the matured judgement* of the age, which refuses to be any
longer entertained with illusory knowledge, It is, in fact, a call to reason,
again to undertake the most laborious of all tasks—that of self-examination,
and to establish a tribunal, which may secure it in its well-grounded claims,
while it pronounces against all baseless assumptions and pretensions, not in an
arbitrary manner, but according to its own eternal and unchangeable laws. This
tribunal is nothing less than the critical investigation of pure reason.
I do not mean by
this a criticism of books and systems, but a critical inquiry into the faculty
of reason, with reference to the cognitions to which it strives to attain
without the aid of experience; in other words, the solution of the question
regarding the possibility or impossibility of metaphysics, and the
determination of the origin, as well as of the extent and limits of this
science. All this must be done on the basis of principles.
This path—the
only one now remaining—has been entered upon by me; and I flatter myself that I
have, in this way, discovered the cause of—and consequently the mode of
removing—all the errors which have hitherto set reason at variance with itself,
in the sphere of non-empirical thought. I have not returned an evasive answer
to the questions of reason, by alleging the inability and limitation of the
faculties of the mind; I have, on the contrary, examined them completely in the
light of principles, and, after having discovered the cause of the doubts and
contradictions into which reason fell, have solved them to its perfect
satisfaction. It is true, these questions have not been solved as dogmatism, in
its vain fancies and desires, had expected; for it can only be satisfied by the
exercise of magical arts, and of these I have no knowledge. But neither do
these come within the compass of our mental powers; and it was the duty of
philosophy to destroy the illusions which had their origin in misconceptions,
whatever darling hopes and valued expectations may be ruined by its
explanations. My chief aim in this work has been thoroughness; and I make bold
to say that there is not a single metaphysical problem that does not find its
solution, or at least the key to its solution, here. Pure reason is a perfect
unity; and therefore, if the principle presented by it prove to be insufficient
for the solution of even a single one of those questions to which the very nature
of reason gives birth, we must reject it, as we could not be perfectly certain
of its sufficiency in the case of the others.
While I say
this, I think I see upon the countenance of the reader signs of dissatisfaction
mingled with contempt, when he hears declarations which sound so boastful and
extravagant; and yet they are beyond comparison more moderate than those
advanced by the commonest author of the commonest philosophical programme, in
which the dogmatist professes to demonstrate the simple nature of the soul, or
the necessity of a primal being. Such a dogmatist promises to extend human
knowledge beyond the limits of possible experience; while I humbly confess that
this is completely beyond my power. Instead of any such attempt, I confine
myself to the examination of reason alone and its pure thought; and I do not
need to seek far for the sum-total of its cognition, because it has its seat in
my own mind. Besides, common logic presents me with a complete and systematic
catalogue of all the simple operations of reason; and it is my task to answer
the question how far reason can go, without the material presented and the aid
furnished by experience.
So much for the
completeness and thoroughness necessary in the execution of the present task.
The aims set before us are not arbitrarily proposed, but are imposed upon us by
the nature of cognition itself.
The above
remarks relate to the matter of our critical inquiry. As regards the form,
there are two indispensable conditions, which any one who undertakes so
difficult a task as that of a critique of pure reason, is bound to fulfil.
These conditions are certitude and clearness.
As regards
certitude, I have fully convinced myself that, in this sphere of thought,
opinion is perfectly inadmissible, and that everything which bears the least semblance
of an hypothesis must be excluded, as of no value in such discussions. For it
is a necessary condition of every cognition that is to be established upon a
priori grounds that it shall be held to be absolutely necessary; much more is
this the case with an attempt to determine all pure a priori cognition, and to
furnish the standard—and consequently an example—of all apodeictic
(philosophical) certitude. Whether I have succeeded in what I professed to do,
it is for the reader to determine; it is the author’s business merely to adduce
grounds and reasons, without determining what influence these ought to have on
the mind of his judges. But, lest anything he may have said may become the
innocent cause of doubt in their minds, or tend to weaken the effect which his
arguments might otherwise produce—he may be allowed to point out those passages
which may occasion mistrust or difficulty, although these do not concern the
main purpose of the present work. He does this solely with the view of removing
from the mind of the reader any doubts which might affect his judgement of the
work as a whole, and in regard to its ultimate aim.
I know no
investigations more necessary for a full insight into the nature of the faculty
which we call understanding, and at the same time for the determination of the
rules and limits of its use, than those undertaken in the second chapter of the
“Transcendental Analytic,” under the title of “Deduction of the Pure
Conceptions of the Understanding”; and they have also cost me by far the
greatest labour—labour which, I hope, will not remain uncompensated. The view
there taken, which goes somewhat deeply into the subject, has two sides, The
one relates to the objects of the pure understanding, and is intended to
demonstrate and to render comprehensible the objective validity of its a priori
conceptions; and it forms for this reason an essential part of the Critique.
The other considers the pure understanding itself, its possibility and its
powers of cognition—that is, from a subjective point of view; and, although
this exposition is of great importance, it does not belong essentially to the
main purpose of the work, because the grand question is what and how much can
reason and understanding, apart from experience, cognize, and not, how is the
faculty of thought itself possible? As the latter is an inquiry into the cause
of a given effect, and has thus in it some semblance of an hypothesis
(although, as I shall show on another occasion, this is really not the fact),
it would seem that, in the present instance, I had allowed myself to enounce a
mere opinion, and that the reader must therefore be at liberty to hold a
different opinion. But I beg to remind him that, if my subjective deduction
does not produce in his mind the conviction of its certitude at which I aimed,
the objective deduction, with which alone the present work is properly
concerned, is in every respect satisfactory.
As regards
clearness, the reader has a right to demand, in the first place, discursive or
logical clearness, that is, on the basis of conceptions, and, secondly,
intuitive or aesthetic clearness, by means of intuitions, that is, by examples
or other modes of illustration in concreto. I have done what I could for the
first kind of intelligibility. This was essential to my purpose; and it thus
became the accidental cause of my inability to do complete justice to the
second requirement. I have been almost always at a loss, during the progress of
this work, how to settle this question. Examples and illustrations always appeared
to me necessary, and, in the first sketch of the Critique, naturally fell into
their proper places. But I very soon became aware of the magnitude of my task,
and the numerous problems with which I should be engaged; and, as I perceived
that this critical investigation would, even if delivered in the driest
scholastic manner, be far from being brief, I found it unadvisable to enlarge
it still more with examples and explanations, which are necessary only from a
popular point of view. I was induced to take this course from the consideration
also that the present work is not intended for popular use, that those devoted
to science do not require such helps, although they are always acceptable, and
that they would have materially interfered with my present purpose. Abbe
Terrasson remarks with great justice that, if we estimate the size of a work,
not from the number of its pages, but from the time which we require to make
ourselves master of it, it may be said of many a book that it would be much
shorter, if it were not so short. On the other hand, as regards the
comprehensibility of a system of speculative cognition, connected under a
single principle, we may say with equal justice: many a book would have been
much clearer, if it had not been intended to be so very clear. For explanations
and examples, and other helps to intelligibility, aid us in the comprehension
of parts, but they distract the attention, dissipate the mental power of the
reader, and stand in the way of his forming a clear conception of the whole; as
he cannot attain soon enough to a survey of the system, and the colouring and
embellishments bestowed upon it prevent his observing its articulation or
organization—which is the most important consideration with him, when he comes
to judge of its unity and stability.
The reader must
naturally have a strong inducement to co-operate with the present author, if he
has formed the intention of erecting a complete and solid edifice of
metaphysical science, according to the plan now laid before him. Metaphysics,
as here represented, is the only science which admits of completion—and with
little labour, if it is united, in a short time; so that nothing will be left
to future generations except the task of illustrating and applying it
didactically. For this science is nothing more than the inventory of all that
is given us by pure reason, systematically arranged. Nothing can escape our
notice; for what reason produces from itself cannot lie concealed, but must be
brought to the light by reason itself, so soon as we have discovered the common
principle of the ideas we seek. The perfect unity of this kind of cognitions,
which are based upon pure conceptions, and uninfluenced by any empirical
element, or any peculiar intuition leading to determinate experience, renders
this completeness not only practicable, but also necessary.
Tecum habita, et
noris quam sit tibi curta supellex.
— Persius. Satirae iv. 52.
Such a system of
pure speculative reason I hope to be able to publish under the title of
Metaphysic of Nature.* The content of this work (which will not be half so
long) will be very much richer than that of the present Critique, which has to
discover the sources of this cognition and expose the conditions of its
possibility, and at the same time to clear and level a fit foundation for the
scientific edifice. In the present work, I look for the patient hearing and the
impartiality of a judge; in the other, for the goodwill and assistance of a
co-labourer. For, however complete the list of principles for this system may
be in the Critique, the correctness of the system requires that no deduced
conceptions should be absent. These cannot be presented a priori, but must be
gradually discovered; and, while the synthesis of conceptions has been fully
exhausted in the Critique, it is necessary that, in the proposed work, the same
should be the case with their analysis. But this will be rather an amusement
than a labour.
Dari uji petik yang diambil dari bacaan
diatas, jika kita pandang dari pemikiran filsuf (bukan dari nilai hasil uji
petik) kita bisa melihat bagaimana Immanuel Kant membuat kalimat – kalimat itu
dalam bentuk kalimat filsafat. Bahasa yang digunakan Immanuel Kant dalam
membuat bukunya menggunakan bahasa analog. Jika kita pandang lagi, pada tahun
1781 ketika Immanuel Kant selesai membuat buku dengan pemikiran seperti itu,
orang Indonesia masih berjuang untuk menjadi manusia. Ini terjadi karena
Immanuel Kant membaca buku. Dengan membaca, dimensi kehidupan akan meningkat.
Selengkapnya buku Immanuel Kant tentang The Critique of Pure Reason dapat di
downlod di https://uny.academia.edu/MarsigitHrd
Wassalamualaikum wr.wb.
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